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Abstract
Several decades after formally attaining independence, many developing countries
continue to trade disproportionately with the European countries that once ruled
them.  Earlier attempts to examine this phenomenon have relied on inappropriate
statistical techniques.  After reviewing the existing literature, this paper draws on
insights from economic history as well as the theory of industrial organization in
order to motivate a different approach. History shows that there were crucial
differences between the major colonial powers in respect of the nature and duration
of the trade-diverting policies they imposed on their colonies; their treatment of
different colonies; and of colonial exports as against imports.  Theory suggests that
when early entrants have sunk costs of marketing and distribution, market size is an
important determinant of the entry of new suppliers. These insights are combined in
an econometric specification that seeks to explain the market shares of Britain and
France in different countries by their size, distance and (where relevant) time since
independence.  Exploratory tests, using panel data on imports by 119 developing
countries for the period 1994-1999, give qualified support to the hypothesis that high
market shares for the former colonial powers persist, especially in smaller, nearer,
and more recently independent countries.
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In an increasingly integrated world economy, one would expect that trade flows
should follow comparative advantage, with imports being procured from the cheapest
source.  Yet, several studies have found that a past colonial relationship significantly
influences the volume of trade between pairs of countries.  European countries have
a much larger share of the market of their former colonies than the rest of the world,
even decades after decolonization and the termination of institutionalized trade
preferences should have ended any artificial diversion of trade towards the former
colonial power.  This was first noticed over a quarter century ago in a flurry of papers
in leading academic journals.  The debate soon died down, perhaps because the
statistical tools used to demonstrate the trade bias were rudimentary, attempts to
explain it were on the whole non-economic, and in any case the degree of bias
appeared to be dwindling quite rapidly.  In recent years, without referring to this
earlier literature, many econometric investigations into the determinants of trade
patterns have added a dummy variable representing ex-colonial status to the so-
called ￿gravity￿ equation, and found it to be strongly significant.  But (with a few
exceptions) these authors have not attempted to probe deeper into the reasons for
the bias, and whether it is weakening over time.
After reviewing these two research episodes in Section 2, this paper draws on
insights from economic history as well as the theory of industrial organization in
Section 3, to obtain a better econometric specification, which is tested in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.  But first, in order to motivate the discussion, Fig. 1 [reproduced
at the end of this paper] illustrates the phenomenon graphically.  It plots the British
and French shares of 116 developing countries￿ imports from industrial countries,
calculated using the latest available (1999) data from the IMF￿s Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook 2002.  Triangles representing countries that were colonies of
neither former imperial power cluster near the origin (in fact most of them are
obscured by the congestion near the origin) and around a hypothetical 45￿ line,
indicating modest and roughly equal market shares.  But observations for most of the
former colonies are splayed out towards the respective axes, showing dramatically
higher shares for their former rulers, especially France.
1  And this is despite the fact
                                                          
1 Interestingly, while British exports do not seem to have penetrated the former French colonies to any
greater degree than countries that were not colonies, France seems to have secured larger market
shares than Britain in several British colonies.  These are the countries represented by diamond-
shaped markers lying below the 45￿ line.  They are, in increasing order of French market share: the
Bahamas, Seychelles, Malta, Bahrain, Mauritius, and Bermuda.  The Seychelles and Mauritius were
under Dutch and then French control; Britain formally took over in 1814, and retained French as an
official language, which shows that language and culture play a greater role than political control in
influencing trade patterns.  The case of Bermuda is particularly surprising because it was still a British
colony in 1999.  Note, however, that except for the Bahamas, the British market share in the other five2
that almost all the colonies in the figure became independent more than 35 years
earlier.
2
2.  Earlier studies
The first phase of research into this phenomenon involved a near-simultaneous
￿discovery￿ of the trade bias by two scholars, followed by a brief interchange between
them.  Kleiman (1976) showed that in 1960-62, Europe￿s metropolitan
3 powers had
shares in the trade of their former colonies and dependent overseas territories
(collectively referred to as ￿dependencies￿) which were much higher than their shares
in the trade of all developing countries.  For the dependencies￿ imports, the ratios
between these shares (called the "enforcement ratio" by Kleiman) were: United
Kingdom 3.0, France 7.8, Italy 11.7, Belgium 15.2, and Portugal 73.4 (Kleiman 1976,
Table 2, p.463).  Strikingly, of the British dependencies’ imports, 38.9% came from
the United Kingdom, but only 2.3% from France; conversely, France had a 60.5%
market share in the imports of its own dependencies, but only 2.8% in those of the
British dependencies (Table 3, p.465).  Kleiman’s study showed that the bias in trade
patterns usually declined after attainment of formal independence, especially in the
French dependencies, but remained perceptible even a decade later.  In subsequent
papers, he showed that the decline in the metropolitan share generally reflected
trade diversification rather than takeover by another dominant power (Kleiman 1977);
and that on average Spain displayed no similar disproportion in trade with its long-
independent Latin American colonies in 1960-62, suggesting that lasting cultural ties
could not be the explanation for the bias observed for the other European countries
(Kleiman 1978a).
4  In a more limited study, Livingstone (1976) showed that in 1972
the shares of Britain and France in the imports of their former colonies, relative to
                                                                                                                                                                                    
anomalous cases remains higher than in most of the countries that it did not rule at all.  Also 1999
was exceptional: apart from Mauritius and Malta, in the case of no other former British colony was the
British share lower than the French share for more than one year between 1994-1998.
2 There is, however, a striking asymmetry that emerges if we reverse the perspective: while Britain
and France continued to loom large as suppliers of imports to their former colonies, the latter
collectively took only 24 (18) per cent of British (French) exports to developing countries in 1999.
Relative to their exports to all destinations, the former colonies￿ collective share was less than five per
cent for both countries.
3 This term was commonly used in the influential ￿dependency￿ literature of the time (and is still used
by many historians) to describe a country having significant economic, political and cultural influence
over others, with or without formal colonization.  I shall use it as convenient shorthand.
4 But see n.1 above for contrary evidence.3
their import share in a control group of mainly European countries, had fallen as
compared to the four years prior to and including the year of independence.
5
In the last decade, scholars have increasingly used the ￿gravity￿ model to
explain the magnitude of trade flows between pairs of countries.  This model posits
that bilateral trade is positively related to the countries￿ GNP and per capita income
and negatively to the distance between them. Several researchers routinely
supplement this specification with dummy variables, including colonial ties, to
capture institutional features that would enhance bilateral trade flows over and above
the levels predicted by the gravity variables.  The focus of this research is usually
something quite different: testing models of intra-industry trade (Hummels and
Levinsohn 1995), estimating the effect of common borders,
6 preferential trade
agreements, currency unions, or membership of international organizations on trade
flows;
7 the trade-promoting role of ethnic networks (Rauch and Trindade 2002) or
institutional similarity between countries (de Groot et al 2003); or the gravity model
itself.  In this burgeoning literature, the colony dummy is included, if at all, merely as
an additional control, technically referred to as a ￿nuisance variable￿.
Different authors give different explanations for the persisting effect of
colonization on trade patterns.  Noting that France retained much higher market
shares than did Britain, Kleiman suggested that tastes formed during colonial rule
were responsible: ￿the result for the French group may be said to fit the popular view
of the French cultivating in their colonies a taste for perfume and pate de foie gras￿
(Kleiman 1976, p. 465 n.).  This, of course, would explain high shares for only certain
consumer goods, but the phenomenon was also found for standardised intermediate
goods like iron and steel (Yeats 1990).  For Lazear (1999), the effect is entirely
attributable to a common language.  He presents evidence that countries trade
disproportionately with others sharing the same language, which is usually that of the
colonial power.  He uses this as confirmation of his model of communication costs
within firms employing multicultural teams with disjoint skill and information sets.
                                                          
5 In an ensuing exchange of limited relevance to this paper, Kleiman (1978b) and Livingstone (1978)
debated the significance of import-substitution policies in the former colonies on the absolute volume
of metropolitan exports, in order to calculate export losses attributable to decolonization.  Svedberg
(1981) applied the same methodology to the stock of foreign direct investment, and found greater
persistence in the metropolitan share than in the case of trade.
6 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and the earlier literature cited there.
7 Andrew Rose is the most prolific practitioner of this kind of analysis.  All his published and
forthcoming papers (as well as links to those of other researchers working in the same area) are
accessible at http:/haas.berkeley.edu/arose.  An interesting recent critique by Ritschl and Wolf (2003)
shows that Rose￿s estimation of the effects of currency unions and trade agreements is inflated by
endogeneity bias, arising from the fact that such arrangements were formed between countries that4
Most authors in the gravity tradition also refer in passing to the obvious
importance of cultural and linguistic similarities in reducing communication and
transaction costs.  Some, however, have delved slightly more deeply into the nature
of the colonial link.  Rauch (1999) shows that when separate dummies are used for a
common language (which he takes as a proxy for taste similarity) and for a colonial
tie (a proxy for business links), the former is never positive and significant, while the
latter is always so, and larger for differentiated as compared to homogeneous
products.  One possible interpretation of the significance of this latter result is offered
by Rauch and Trindade (2002), who find a similar (but weaker) effect of the presence
of Chinese immigrant populations in promoting bilateral trade.  According to them,
there are two possible explanations for the role of ethnic ties in promoting trade:
such ties facilitate the dissemination of information required for matching potential
buyers and sellers, and they also provide informal mechanisms for enforcement of
contracts. Because the latter should not differ between differentiated and
homogeneous products, the finding of a greater impact for differentiated products
suggests that matching is more important than contract enforcement.  They also find
that the importance of both social networks and colonial ties seems to have
weakened between the two time points (1980 and 1990) of the study.
Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) examine the independent role of history by
adding the value of the dependent variable (the magnitude of bilateral trade) for
earlier years to the explanatory variables of the gravity specification, and find that
current trade flows are invariably positively related to these past flows.  Inclusion of
the latter reduces the estimated coefficients for current income, distance, regional
agreements and ex-colonial status.  Coefficients for the trade flows of more recent
years were invariably larger than for earlier ones, indicating a weakening influence of
the past.  Eichengreen and Irwin explain these findings in terms of market-specific
sales, distribution and service networks that are set up during a historical
conjuncture (such as colonial rule) which biased trade in a particular direction, but
continue to facilitate it even afterwards.
Finally, using a non-gravity approach, Cassing and Husted (2004) show that
simple time trends fitted to import market shares for 93 countries over the period
1980-2000 have slopes that are essentially flat in most cases, revealing remarkable
stability of the shares.  Inspired by the recent literature on geography and trade, they
invoke sunk costs and scale economies in the development of transportation
                                                                                                                                                                                    
were already trading extensively with each other (as earlier shown by Eichengreen and Irwin 1995 for
the 1930s).  The same critique obviously does not apply to the colonial relationship.5
networks, and mention colonial ties as one of several possible determinants of a high
initial share, which tends to persist.
3.  History, gravity and anti-gravity
If one sets out specifically to examine the influence of a colonial past on present
trade patterns, the literature surveyed above suffers from several limitations.
Kleiman and Livingstone estimated the decline over time in the share of trade with
the metropolis for heterogeneous groups of ex-colonies, even though the rate of
decline could have been mediated by country-specific variables.  Conversely, the
authors who added a colonial dummy to a gravity specification either ignored the
temporal dimension, or picked it up by examining the coefficient on the dummy
variable from cross-section estimates at two distinct time points.  The use of an
additive colonial dummy moreover amounts to capturing the effect of colonization as
a shift of the intercept of gravity relationship, without recognizing the specificities of
different colonial relationships, or the possibility that the effects of the gravity
variables are different for the colonies.  The first two problems can be dealt with by
using panel data, and the third by interacting the colony dummy with the gravity
variables.
There are however further problems with the gravity model itself in the context
of colonial trade flows.  Particularly troubling is the use of two-way bilateral flows
(exports as well as imports) as the regressand.
8  Kleiman (1976) had already
noticed, using data from the 1960s, that the bias in the former colonies￿ exports was
declining more rapidly than the bias in their imports.  He attributed this to the greater
ease with which exports could be reoriented as compared to imports, which are
influenced by preferences that change only slowly.  I would like to suggest an
alternative explanation.  The stereotype of a ￿colonial￿ trade pattern is no doubt one
in which the colony was developed as a source of raw materials for the metropolis
and a market for the latter￿s exports, thereby artificially promoting bilateral trade in
both directions.  A brief excursion into economic history shows that actual policies
differed systematically as between exports to and imports from the metropolis.  It
also shows that there were crucial differences between the nature and duration of
British and French colonial policies which could have had a bearing on their long-
term influence.
9
                                                          
8 In some studies, only exports are included, but since the estimation is undertaken over all country
pairs, this too amounts to looking at bilateral trade flows.
9 The following is based on Drummond (1972, 1974), Pomfret (1988), Meredith (1996), Fieldhouse
(1999), Hinds (2001), Krozewski (2001) and Cain and Hopkins (2002).  Many of these authors attempt6
3.1.  Trade Preferences
The Cobden-Chevalier agreement of 1861 committed Britain and France to free
trade at home and non-discrimination in their colonies.  But from 1881 onwards,
France began raising import duties and following a policy of tariff assimilation
towards many of her colonies, meaning that they had to admit French products duty-
free while goods of other industrial countries had to pay the relatively high French
tariff. Britain, on the other hand, practiced what historians have called ￿the
imperialism of free trade￿, refraining from imposing protective duties at home or
abroad.  This, however, involved a ￿triangular￿ pattern of trade in which Britain ran a
current account surplus with her colonies, who in turn ran a surplus with the rest of
the world, enabling the metropolis to settle her chronic deficit with the latter.  This
changed in 1932, when in response to the Depression, Britain departed from free
trade and the Ottawa Conference extended the limited system of Imperial Preference
that had been initiated by the White Dominions in the late 19
th century.
Discriminatory tariffs and quotas were now instituted against non-empire imports.
These arrangements disproportionately benefited metropolitan exports to the
colonies, rather than colonial exports to the metropoles.  Until the 1930s the colonies
paid the full French duty on some of their exports to France, while for most other
primary products France maintained low or zero duties, leaving little scope for
preferential treatment of colonial exports.  True reciprocal preferences were initiated
when France began raising barriers against imports from non-empire countries in
1931, allowing colonial exports a surprix over depressed world prices.  Britain,
however, maintained zero duties on most primary products even after departing from
free trade, allowing no margin of preference.  After 1939, she appropriated colonial
exports through bulk purchases by marketing boards at low prices.
Preferences in favour of metropolitan exports were not enforced evenly
throughout the two empires, with Britain securing fewer advantages than France.  In
former German territories held under League of Nations mandate, the mandatory
power could not impose discrimination in its favour.  The same was true of areas
covered by various agreements arrived at between the European powers during their
"scramble for Africa". France imposed preferences on her African colonies after
withdrawing from the relevant sections of the Anglo-French convention in 1936.
Britain continued to abide by her non-discrimination commitments to France, but
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to tally the costs and benefits of colonial trade and currency arrangements, for the metropoles as well
as the colonies.  My concern in this paper is merely to establish the argument made in the preceding7
denounced the Anglo-Japanese convention of 1904 in respect of her West Indian
and West African colonies, and imposed quotas on Japanese exports to these areas.
In India (that is, the present India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), strong nationalist
opposition limited the preferences that were granted to Britain, although again
quotas were imposed on imports from Japan. Further, the benefits of preferences
within the British empire also accrued to competitive manufacturers in Canada (for
automobiles) and India (for textiles); France had no comparable rivals within its
empire. Finally, the British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore remained
free-trading entrep￿ts.
Empire preferences continued after the War, shielded from the ￿Most
Favoured Nation￿ principle of the GATT by a ￿grandfather clause￿ (Article I.2) that
excluded existing preferential arrangements.  Following the wave of decolonization
of the late 1950s, some colonies became overseas departments of France,
assimilated to the French tariff; others became overseas territories, giving
preferential treatment to French goods but with duty-free access to France for their
own; yet others became associated states with preferential access to the French
market. When Belgium and France entered the European Economic Community,
their reciprocal colonial preferences were extended to other members of the EEC.
These arrangements were formalized by the YaoundØ Convention (1963) and the
Arusha Agreement (1968) with the former colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.  Again,
this proved to be asymmetric as between exports and imports. Import quotas were
divided amongst the six EC members, enabling France to share the burden of paying
high prices on the exports of its former colonies.  On the export front, ￿[i]n principle
[France] had lost its unique trade advantages in these overseas markets; but in
practice established market mechanisms, language and consumer preferences gave
it a continued advantage￿ (Fieldhouse 1999, pp.101-102; see also Kreinin 1972 and
McIntyre 1974). Britain instituted a more limited system of Commonwealth
Preferences.
Such arrangements were phased out, or eroded by inflation (which reduced
the ad valorem equivalent of preference margins on specific duties) or by the
adoption of concessional GSP tariffs on imports from developing countries not
covered by these preferences in the 1970s.  The 1975 LomØ Convention gave duty-
free access to the enlarged EC for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
signatories, without ￿reverse preferences￿ for EC exports. But again, ￿Goods covered
by the EC￿s Common Agricultural Policy were largely excluded, while the EC￿s
                                                                                                                                                                                    
two sentences.8
common external tariff on other primary products was low and often zero￿ (Pomfret
1988, p. 80).  Manufactured products, for which preference margins were significant,
were subject to elaborate rules of origin, and there were also instances of countries
being asked to restrain their exports when they threatened EC producers.
3.2.   Currency arrangements
After the breakdown of the Gold Standard in 1931, different countries coalesced into
distinct currency blocs, with Britain anchoring the Sterling Area and France along
with some other countries in Western Europe remaining on gold for a few years
more.  By removing exchange rate risk on trade between member countries, these
arrangements should have promoted trade between them and diverted it away from
non-members.  Using the gravity model, Ritschl and Wolf (2003) have shown that in
fact the countries that formed the sterling bloc already traded disproportionately with
each other in 1928.  Their data, however, are almost entirely confined to developed
countries.  In order to understand the impact of currency arrangements on the
colonies, we must refer to the work of historians rather than economists.
Economic historians have increasingly questioned the traditional view of UK
colonial policy as reflecting the interests of provincial manufacturers in assuring
markets and raw material supplies.  Instead, they argue that it served the interests of
the City of London and its ￿gentlemanly capitalists￿ ￿ the term employed in the
influential work of Cain and Hopkins (2002) -- in maintaining the role of sterling as an
international currency, the City as a financial centre, and the value of Britain￿s
invisible earnings from overseas investments and financial services.  On this
reading, even Imperial Preference was designed not so much to give a sheltered
market to British exporters, but to enable the colonies and Dominions to prop up their
exports so as to be able to meet their debt service obligations to British financial
institutions.
After withdrawing from the Gold Standard in 1931 and 1936 respectively, both
Britain and France established currency zones in which almost all colonies used
either the currency of the imperial power, or a currency pegged to it, with their gold
and foreign currency reserves held by the metropolis.  The Sterling Area took on a
deliberately trade-diverting role with the onset of Britain￿s dollar crisis from 1939.
Participants ￿agreed to sell surplus gold and dollar reserves to the Bank of England
for sterling, and to exercise restraint in converting sterling into dollars ￿ and to
import goods from the Dollar Area only when these goods were not available within9
the Sterling Area￿ (Hinds, 2001, p.11). Or, as a contemporary observer, the
Cambridge economist Dennis Robertson more colourfully put it,
its mechanism was now to be used for the first time not merely as
an instrument of war but, with more lasting effects, as an instrument
of deliberate discrimination against certain products of certain not
unfriendly countries.... It meant that each [member] country as a
country agreed to hand over its surplus dollar earnings to Mother
[Britain] in exchange for sterling, and to go to Mother when it
wanted extra dollars to spend.  Naturally the degree of confidence
with which it exercised or presented claims on the dollar pool
depended partly on its political status; the little black children, who
were often the best earners, could be smacked on the head if they
showed too great a propensity to spend dollars, while the grown-up
white daughters [Australia and New Zealand], who were often
pretty extravagant, could only be quietly reasoned with.
10
Formal and informal restrictions on imports from the Dollar Area were
tightened after Britain￿s disastrous attempt to return to convertibility in 1947.  This
financial architecture meant that while the colonies￿ imports from the Dollar Area
were restricted, they were encouraged to earn dollars with their exports so as to
support the metropolitan currency, thus shoring up the triangular pattern of trade that
had broken down during the 1930s. Again, the restrictions were unevenly enforced,
with India proving to be a drain on the dollar pool.  Similar restrictions were instituted
by France in 1939,
for the same reasons as by Britain: to use colonial foreign-
exchange earnings for imperial purposes.  Convertibility was
suspended and all foreign-exchange holdings and bullion were
concentrated in the metropolitan, and later Free French, agencies.
The system remained intact for all territories under effective French
                                                          
10 Robertson (1954, pp.36, 38-39, emphasis in the original).  The strong language used here does not
imply that Robertson was sympathetic to the colonies.  Far from it: he went on to argue that ￿with the
rise in prices and in the volume of trade since 1945, it is natural that these territories should require to
keep larger currency reserves and banking balances in London; and as to their exceptional [dollar]
earnings in 1950, it would not have been true kindness to allow these simple peoples to dissipate
them in the way that the sophisticated Australians chose to do.  I do not think that on the whole it can
be justly said that Britain has either unduly exploited or unduly neglected her colonial estate￿ (ibid,
p.48).  He also believed that the demand for dollars of the less developed members of the Sterling
Area was excessive because of their over-ambitious development plans (pp.55-56).10
control until the franc became fully convertible in 1958.  As in the
British case, this gave the metropolis dictatorial powers over the
pattern of trade and was used to bolster the franc as an
international currency. The same criticism applies: being forced to
buy from France restricted the colonies’ range of choice,
contributed to inflation due to high French prices, and probably held
back economic development. (Fieldhouse 1999, p.114).
Restrictions on imports from outside the currency zones were dismantled by both
Britain and France between 1952 and 1954 as they closed the dollar gap and moved
towards convertibility in 1958. Most British colonies broke away from the Sterling
Area when they became independent (although it was formally abolished only in
1972).  Most of France￿s former colonies in Africa, however, retained the
(convertible) CFA Franc, whose exchange rate with the French franc remained
unchanged between 1948 and 1994, and then again until 1999 when it was pegged
to the Euro.  This meant that trade with France remained singularly free from
exchange rate risk, even as the progressive overvaluation of the CFA Franc made
imports more attractive and discouraged exports to the rest of the world.
The combined effect of trade preferences and currency zones ensured that
the intensity of bilateral trade between the metropoles and their colonies peaked in
the early 1950s.  However, a British official Working Party set up in 1956 was
sceptical about the benefits of trade preferences, whether for Britain or for the other
European powers (Goldsworthy, 1994, p.395). Significantly, anticipating the
arguments of the recent theoretical papers discussed above, it pointed out that
The close commercial ties between metropolitan countries and their
DOTs [dependent overseas territories] is of great importance to the
trade of the metropolitan countries and in spite of the limited scope
of tariff preferences, the metropolitan countries in most cases have
the largest individual share of their DOTs purchases from abroad.
Discrimination in import controls may have had some influence at
times but does not account, except in the case of the French DOTs,
where quantitative restrictions are heavily used, for this striking
situation. In most of the DOTs what seems to be of much more
importance is the influence of long-standing technical and
commercial connections. (ibid., p.142)11
4.  An alternative framework
Our historical excursion shows that there were substantial differences between
Britain and France in respect of the mechanics and duration of the trade-distorting
measures they imposed on their colonies; their treatment of different colonies; and of
imports as against exports.  Further, to the extent that most colonies￿ exports to the
metropolis were predominantly of homogenous primary products that did not require
elaborate marketing, distribution and service networks, one would not expect the
long-term effects discussed in the theoretical literature surveyed in Section 2.  Their
imports, on the other hand, comprised mainly differentiated manufactured goods that
fit those explanations.
11  The gravity models￿ lumping together of imports and
exports, and of bilateral trade between all country pairs, is therefore inappropriate for
examining the persistence of colonial trade patterns. In any case, the EC continues
to give LomØ Convention preferences to the ACP countries, and to other developing
countries under the GSP, so some diversion of their export trade is only to be
expected.
12 What needs to be explained is the bias in developing country imports,
where there have been no formal preferences for the EC since 1975.  Accordingly,
the empirical exercise that follows confines itself to imports, returning to the market-
share approach of the earliest (Kleiman/Livingstone) and latest (Cassing and
Husted) contributions.  Unlike those papers, I employ certain gravity variables as
regressors (but with a different theoretical motivation), and use panel data which
allows for individual country effects as well as the temporal dimension.
13
For descriptive purposes, I use a modification of Kleiman￿s ￿enforcement ratio￿
to show the disproportionate metropolitan presence in the markets of former
colonies.  Like Kleiman, for each developing country, I normalize the market share of
a metropolis in each country by its market share in all developing countries that were
not its colonies.  But unlike Kleiman, in order to ensure greater comparability in the
range of goods and competitor countries, the market shares are calculated with
reference to imports from all industrial countries, rather than the rest of the world.
Instead of enforcement ratio, I refer to this ratio as an index of ￿Revealed Historical
                                                          
11 Recall that Rauch (1999) found that the ￿former colony effect￿ on trade intensity was larger for
differentiated than for homogeneous products.
12 Under the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, LomØ preferences are to give way to gradual transition to
Free Trade Agreements from 2007 (which will reinstate ￿reverse preferences￿ for EU exporters).  They
have already been eroded by the EC￿s duty-free treatment of ￿Everything But Arms￿ imported from
non-ACP Least-Developed Countries since 2001.  But all the gravity studies surveyed above, as well
as my own empirical analysis below, use data from the period when preferences under LomØ and the
GSP were in force.
13 Time series issues arising from the possibility of unit roots are no doubt important, but could not be
addressed due to the short time span of the panel.  They will be dealt with in future work.12
Advantage￿ (RHA), due to its similarity to the widely-used measure of Revealed
















where  Mim is the value of imports of the i
th importing country from the m
th metropolis,
E  is the set of all countries that were or are colonies of m, and I the set of all
industrial countries.  Figure 2 plots the unweighted average of the individual RHA
indices, computed from import data in the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbooks, for the former British and French colonies for the period 1994-99.
Clearly, as Kleiman (1976) found for the early 1960s, France remains better able to
divert the imports of its former colonies than Britain, although the pull of both
countries is perceptibly weakening.
For the regression analysis, however, I use the market shares (the numerator
of the RHA expression) as the regressand, applying a standard logistic
transformation to permit the disturbances to vary between plus and minus infinity.
14
The British (French) market share in other developing countries (the denominator of
RHA) was used as a control variable on the right hand side, but proved to be
insignificant as it was picked up by the time variable, and was dropped.
15  The other
regressors resemble those of the gravity equation, but are grounded in an analytical
approach drawn from industrial organization (IO) rather than trade theory.  Recall
that most of the authors who examined the persistence issue referred to the sunk
costs of acquiring information about markets and setting up transport, marketing and
distribution networks.  Standard IO models suggest that such costs limit the number
of competitors, and give a lasting advantage to early entrants, when they are large
relative to market size.
16  If we aggregate from individual product markets to the
national market, and from individual exporting firms to the countries in which they are
based, this justifies the inclusion of the importing country￿s GDP and population as
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14 That is, the market share is transformed as s/(1-s), where s is the unadjusted market share.
15 Regressions with RHA as the dependent variable were also attempted, and gave similar qualitative
results, except for a significant coefficient on the time variable for the French regression.  This was
probably due to the trend in the denominator of RHA, since it could not be detected in the regressions
for the numerator.  A reason for the absence of trend in the market share is given below.
16  Most IO models differ greatly in the way in which they treat the entry process and the nature of
post-entry competition, but the ￿bounds approach￿ popularised by Sutton (1991, 2000) shows that
there is a lower bound to concentration which is robust to these details.13
determinants of the shares of their major suppliers.  The ratio between these two
variables (or the difference between their logarithmic transformations) also allows us
to capture the effect of the destination country￿s per capita GDP on the former
colonial power￿s trade share.  This would be relevant if the latter￿s products are more
suited, relative to those of competitor countries, to higher or lower income buyers.
The inclusion of geographical distance from the exporter should need no justification.
Two alternative specifications were estimated, one capturing the intertemporal
variation with a time trend, and the other with year-specific dummy variables.  For
the ith ￿country￿ (some were actually overseas departments of France) and year t:
SHAREit =  it i it i i i it it POP FD GDP FD FD DIST POP GDP * * 6 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β β α + + + + + +
        ε β β β β + + + + + i i it i i i CFAD PD YRSINDEP FD DIST FD 10 9 8 7 * * (1)
SHAREit =  it i it i i i it it POP FD GDP FD FD DIST POP GDP * * 6 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β β α + + + + + +
                  ε β β β β β + + + + + + ∑ t t i i it i i i D CFAD PD INDEPYR FD DIST FD
99
95
10 9 8 7 * * (2)
where
SHAREit  =    Logistic transformation of the British (French) share of imports of
country i  in year t from all industrial countries.
GDPit  =        Natural logarithm of GDP of country i in year t.
POPit  =        Natural logarithm of population of country i in year t
DISTi  =        Natural logarithm of great circle distance from London (Paris) to
capital or major port of country i
FDi = Dummy variable taking the value 1 if country i was a former
British (French) colony, 0 otherwise
PDi  =        Dummy variable taking the value 1 if country i is still a British
(French) colony, overseas department or territory, 0 otherwise
INDEPYRi =  Year of independence of country i
YRSINDEPit =   Number of years since independence of country i as of year t
CFADI  =  Dummy variable taking the value 1 if country i was a member of
the CFA, 0 otherwise (French regressions only).
Dt   =  Year dummy, taking the value 1 for year t, 0 otherwise.14
For each country, DIST and INDEPYR obviously remain unchanged through
the six years of the panel.  The colony dummies could in principle switch between 0
and 1 if a colony became independent during the sample period, but in fact there are
no such cases.  All other variables can change from year to year, and are therefore
given time subscripts. Note that in equation (1), the number of years since
independence is incremented for each year in the panel, while in (2) the year of
independence remains fixed for each country, and temporal variation is picked up by
the year dummies, using 1994 as the reference year.  A priori, one would expect
SHARE to be related negatively to the three gravity variables, as larger market size
and greater distance from the metropolis encourage competitors from other
countries.  It should also be negatively related to YRSINDEP but positively to
INDEPYR (the more recently a colony became independent, the greater the residual
influence of the colonial trade pattern). Positive signs are expected for the colony
dummies, and negative signs for the year dummies.
Specifications (1) and (2) were estimated separately for Britain and France,
using an unbalanced panel of 119 developing countries for the years 1994-1999.
SHARE was computed from import data in the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbooks.  GDP and POP are from the World Bank World Development Indicators
2002, with a few exceptions.
17  INDEPYR was taken from the sources cited in Table
3; for countries that were not British (French) colonies it was set to 1, which drops
out because this variable enters only interactively with FD, which is zero for such
cases.  YRSINDEP were calculated by subtracting INDEPYR for each former colony
from the current year in the panel.  DIST for most countries was taken from a readily-
available source,
18 and calculated for others using a great circle distance
calculator.
19  The former colonies of French Indo-China were not counted as French
colonies due to their subsequent history, nor were Hong Kong and Singapore
included in view of their high levels of development and historically free-trading
status.  As most of the remaining French colonies gained independence in a single
                                                          
17 GDP figures for Somalia, Djibouti, Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Macau, UAE, Qatar, Uganda,
Seychelles, Brunei, Dominica, Zaire, Cuba, Liberia, Oman, Afghanistan; and population figure for
Dominica (1999) from:  ￿The World Factbook￿, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994 - 1999.  Available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
18  ￿Distance Measure in Useful Gravity Model Data￿, Jon Haveman’s International Trade  Data,
available at: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/
Data/ Gravity/dist.txt.  Although the great circle distance does not correspond to shipping distance, it
is easily available for a large number of countries, and is invariably used in the gravity literature.
19 Available at: http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm.  This calculates distances between
any two locations based on their latitude and longitude, which were obtained from the CIA World
Factbook.15
year (1960), including both FD and FD*INDEPYR in specification (2) resulted in high
colinearity between them.  As the whole point of the specification is to pick up the
time effect with the latter variable, I dropped FD.  Although this problem did not arise
in the case of Britain, FD was dropped from specification (2) there as well for
consistency.  These deletions caused minimal changes in the other estimated
coefficients.  In addition, a dummy variable for countries that had free trade
agreements with the EU was tried, but the coefficient was never significant, and it
was therefore dropped.
Random effects GLS estimates (as indicated by Breusch-Pagan tests),
corrected for first-order autocorrelation, are reported in Table 1.  While interpreting
the results, the insignificant negative coefficient on FD should cause no alarm,
because the ￿colony effect￿ is being picked up by this variable in conjunction with its
interactions with the three gravity variables, each of which is large in magnitude.  A
few anomalous cases can be easily explained.  For example, the coefficients on the
gravity variables were often not significant in the British regression, but they were
significantly distinguishable from zero when interacted with FD, indicating that the
model works well for the former colonies.  In the French case, the coefficients on the
time variables in both specifications are not significantly different from zero, but this
is probably because of another problem caused by the bunching of independence
dates: insufficient variation in an independent variable translates into a high standard
error and statistically insignificant coefficient for that variable.  For Britain, whose
colonies achieved independence over a much longer span of time, the coefficients
are significant and of the expected signs.
There are, however, some puzzling findings.  For Britain, a former colony￿s
population seems to have an unexpectedly positive effect on the British market
share, controlling for all other factors.  One possible interpretation of this is as
follows.  Note that the estimates for the difference (β1 - β2) in conjunction with (β5 ￿
β6) gives the responsiveness of SHARE to per capita GDP for the former colonies.
This is negative for Britain in both specifications, indicating that she has a larger
relative market share in the poorer countries once ruled by her.  For France, the
signs of the relevant coefficients are reversed, suggesting an advantage in higher-
income markets.
20  In the French case, distance (as captured by FD*DIST,
represented by β7) turns out to have an unexpectedly positive effect, even after
                                                          
20 This inference is strengthened by the results of a slightly different specification (not reported here)
in which POP is replaced by per capita GDP, as in some gravity models. Interacted with the colony
dummy, the latter variable has a significantly positive effect for France, but negative for Britain.16
taking into account the negative coefficient β3 on DIST.  This indicates that the
effects of history seem to outweigh those of geography for the former French
colonies, consistent with the much closer and longer-lasting ties that France
established with them.  The role of aid tied to procurement in the donor country
cannot be ruled out as a relevant omitted variable.
5.  Conclusion
On the whole, the main hypotheses of this paper seem to be confirmed by the
empirical evidence.  High metropolitan trade shares tend to persist after formal
decolonisation, especially in countries that are small in terms of market size and
more recently independent.  Market presence seems to fall off with distance, but this
is inexplicably reversed for the French colonies.  In ongoing work, I hope to examine
these issues with a longer panel, so as to apply error-correction methods appropriate













GDP 0.11** 0.12*** 0.12** 0.13***
(2.28) (2.44) (2.37) (2.35)
POP -0.06 -0.07 -0.10** -0.12***
(-1.40) (-1.47) (-2.24) (-2.61)
DIST -0.91*** -0.50*** -1.00*** -0.99***
(-2.86) (-2.81) (-5.33) (-4.98)
FD 10.99*** -13.10
(2.80) (-1.96)
FD*GDP -0.49*** -0.51*** 0.27 0.16
(-3.68) (-4.15) (0.87) (0.53)
FD*POP 0.44*** 0.36*** -0.32 -0.31
(4.08) (3.45) (-1.09) (-0.98)
FD*DIST -0.43 -0.33 1.75*** 1.57***
(-1.18) (-0.88) (3.11) (2.72)
PD 0.70 0.66 4.14*** 4.06***

















CONSTANT -0.44 -0.61 4.52 4.64
(-0.29) (-0.35) (2.51) (2.42)
N 689 689 700 700
R-Squared 0.46 0.45 0.65 0.65
( z-statistics in brackets)
             * 10% significance level
            ** 5% significance level
           *** 1% significance levelTABLE 2: MATRIX OF BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FRANCE BRITAIN
GDP POP DIST GDP POP DIST
GDP 1 1
POP 0.8524 1 0.8497 1
DIST 0.0321 0.0018 1 0.067 0.0328 1






BERMUDA PD GUADELOUPE PD
BAHAMAS, THE 1973 GUIANA, FRENCH PD
BAHARAIN* 1971 MARTINIQUE PD
BANGLADESH* 1947 NEW CALEDONIA PD
BARBADOS* 1962 REUNION PD
BELIZE 1981 ALGERIA 1962
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 1984 BENIN*
# 1960




FIJI 1970 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
# 1960
GAMBIA, THE 1965 CHAD
# 1960
GHANA 1957 COMOROS* 1975
GRENADA 1974 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF
# 1960
GUYANA 1966 COTE D'IVOIRE
# 1960
INDIA 1947 DJIBOUTI* 1977
JAMAICA 1962 GABON
# 1960
KENYA 1963 GUINEA* 1958
KUWAIT* 1961 MADAGASCAR 1960
MALAWI 1964 MALI
# 1960
MALAYSIA 1957 MAURITANIA 1960














St.VINCENT & GRENADINES 1979
TANZANIA 1961
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO* 1960
UGANDA 1962
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES* 1971
ZAMBIA 1964
ZIMBABWE 1980
Source: Springhall (2001, pp. xii-xiii), except those marked (*), for which year of
independence was taken from WORLD GEOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA Vols 1-5 Mc
Graw Hill, 1994. PD indicates present colony, overseas territory or department.Other Countries:
Equatorial Guinea
#  , Mozambique, Cape Verde, Macao, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau
# ,
Burundi, Angola, Zaire, Somalia, Peru, Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, Lao, P.D.Rep. ,
Liberia, Indonesia, Suriname, Venezuela, Netherlands Antilles, Oman, Egypt,
Bolivia, Uruguay, Syrian Arab Rep., Yemen Republic, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon,
Ethiopia, People's Rep. Of China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Thailand, Papua
New Guinea, Nepal, Mongolia, Philippines, Korea, Mexico, Honduras, Paraguay,
Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Colombia, South
Africa, Ecuador, Haiti, Vanuatu, Dominican Republic
   
#CFA country20
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French Mean Index of RHA 12.0958832 11.6678981 13.0401855 11.1525722 9.95761629 8.64146143
British Mean Index of RHA 4.62541333 4.20666933 3.66126841 3.30221845 3.53610394 3.00318766
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999